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An approach to human behavior in economics 
 
The motivation for the 2002 award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Daniel Kahneman 
and Vernon L. Smith sheds light on a hidden on-going revolution that is radically modifying the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics: the cognitive approach to human behavior.  
At the beginning of the ceremony at the Stockholm Concert Hall, Professor Lars-Göran Nilsson 
delivered a Presentation Speech in which he explicitly recognised the success of the new emerging 
approach that challenges the traditional foundations of economic analysis:  
 
“Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Economic theory relies on the assumption that economic agents may be 
likened to a "Homo oeconomicus". This fictitious individual is usually governed by 
self-interest and makes his economic decisions by rationally evaluating the 
consequences of different alternatives, even in complex situations where the outcome 
is difficult to predict. Despite such strong assumptions, this approach has proved to be 
highly rewarding and has enhanced our understanding of many economic phenomena. 
 
Empirical testing of postulates in economic theory confronts theoretical 
predictions with findings from real-world markets and economies. In general, 
however, since "field data" are affected by factors which scarcely allow for control 
and measurement, the identification of causal relationships is problematic. Whereas 
economists have had to overcome such obstacles by using ingenious statistical 
methods, many natural scientists have been able to rely on controlled experiments to 
test their theories. 
 
These common descriptions of theoretical and empirical economic science 
may well have historical validity. But nowadays, they both have to be modified. With 
increasing confidence, researchers in psychological economics have been able to 
demonstrate that in some situations, individuals do not behave like "Homo 
oeconomicus". Researchers in experimental economics have developed methods for 
controlled laboratory experiments in economics. A number of scholars have 
contributed to this development, including previous Laureates: Maurice Allais and 
Herbert Simon thus brought psychological perspectives into decision theory, while 
John Nash and Reinhard Selten conducted early experimental studies. But this year's 
Laureates are the key figures in these two fields. 
[……..] 
Professor Kahneman: Insights from cognitive psychology have been 
instrumental in establishing new theoretical and empirical results; in ongoing 
research, they guide thought-provoking attempts to reformulate many aspects of 
economic and financial theory. The new bridges across disciplines can largely be 
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attributed to your innovative research on the boundary between economics and 
psychology. Professor Smith: Economics used to be regarded as a non-experimental 
science. This is no longer so; nowadays, economic experiments are routinely 
conducted in specialised labs all over the world. Scale or ethics may limit economic 
experimentation, but the methods you have developed continue to enrich our 
empirical toolbox. Both of you have laid the foundations for an exciting renewal of 
economic research. It is a great honour for me to express, on behalf of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences, our warmest congratulations. I now ask you to stop forward 
and receive your Prizes from His Majesty, the King. ” 
 
   The revision of the traditional theory of rationality has therefore reached a critical juncture where 
its inspiring principles and its status as the micro-foundations of economic analysis are being 
seriously called into question. Experimental results were already questioning the validity of the 
standard model of rational action in the 1950s: notably Allais's paradox of 1952 and the empirical 
study of decision processes in firms conducted by Cyert, Simon and Trow in 1956. On the one 
hand, Simon’s approach based on bounded rationality and problem solving was criticising, on the 
basis of field experiments, the scarce realism of the economic theory based on the neo-classical 
assumption of full rationality. On the other, the pioneering works by Allais on expected utility 
theory violations, and the subsequent discoveries by Kahneman and Tversky, that introduced new 
powerful methods of empirical research based on cognitive psychology, proved the systematic 
discrepancy between the predictions of the traditional theory of decision-making and real behavior.  
 
Cognitive psychology then became a fundamental area of inquiry to understand human activities in 
the economic arena, a discipline which is bearing a new theory of human behavior in economics. 
We wonder whether Economics is moving towards new foundations, that are strongly rooted into a 
cognitive approach to human action. 
In the attempt to first answer this question, this introduction will discuss the main features of the 
cognitive representation of human behavior in economics, exploring the most relevant implications 
to the study of economic institutions and their evolution, and searching for the historical roots of 
this approach. Now some general remarks before attempting a historical reconstruction of the 
cognitive roots of Economics. 
 
 The cognitive approach to Economics proposes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human 
problem-solving, choice, decision-making and change, to explain the nature and evolution of 
organizations and economic institutions, in a context characterised by structural uncertainty. 
Just like psychology, neurobiology and philosophy, cognitive economics has its micro-foundations 
in the understanding of human mental activities and it elaborates its models in relation to these 
disciplines and their advancements. As a consequence, the progress in the understanding of the 
activities of the mind that are relevant to explain economic actions will be crucial to allow the 
development of new micro-foundations. Obviously, interactions with disciplines studying the mind 
may also produce negative effects insofar unsolved or much-discussed questions within these 
disciplines can be imported into cognitive economics, which hinder autonomous progress in this 
area. 
What is meant by “model of mind”? Cognitive sciences offered, in fact, different and sometimes 
contrasting positions about how the human mind works.  Although some of these different 
approaches - which only five years ago seemed irreconcilable -, present today a good degree of 
convergence, a multifarious panorama of different models of the mind is still present. Despite 
economists are not explicitly called on to autonomously elaborate a model to explain the mind - 
though the history of economic thought offered some relevant examples to that end, i.e. Marshall, 
Hayek and Simon -, it is certainly right and proper to say that economists give particular attention to 
the different theories and that they use the results reached by cognitive science to build their 
models. However, even though there are evident interferences among the disciplines related to 
cognition, a common core of shared basic principles is clearly emerging. Some of these principles 
 3
will be discussed in the rest of this introduction together with the  analysis of  recent developments 
in the interface between psychology and economics and their historical roots. 
In general, those who now accept a cognitive approach to economics share 
 
 “the idea that the choices people make are determined not only by some 
consistent overall goal and the properties of the external world, but also by the 
knowledge that decision-makers do and don’t have of the world, their ability or 
inability to evoke that knowledge when it is relevant, to work out the consequences of 
their actions, to conjure up possible courses of action, to cope with uncertainty 
(including uncertainty deriving from the possible responses of other actors), and to 
adjudicate among their many competing wants” (Simon 2000, p. 25).   
 
Knowledge and personal knowledge are therefore the cornerstones of decision-making: this implies 
the individual ability to perceive external stimuli and to modify them through interpretation, 
representation and imagination.  Learning can be considered as the engine that allows us to build up 
a representation of the situation and to carry out the steps that precede actions. We are aware that all 
categories, such as learning, framing, perception etc., need to be further explored to achieve a better 
representation of human behaviors in economics; however, the level they have been developed to so 
far is in our view sufficient to re-formulate many of the principles of human action in economics. 
The rest of this introduction will be devoted to a brief historical reconstruction of the cognitive 
approach to economics, while stressing the role of economists who directly and indirectly 
influenced the birth of cognitive sciences1.      
 
 
Historical roots: from Marshall to Hayek 
 
The central historical event that promoted Cognitivism as a new impulse for social sciences was the 
interdisciplinary Cognitive Revolution in 1952-3, with the introduction of the concept of feed-back 
into the analysis, the rise of cybernetics and, more generally, the emergence of what has been called 
the Mind’s New Science (Gardner 1985).  
It would not be surprising to expect that such an approach, which considers the relevance of mental 
processes for economics, started after the cognitive revolution. This is not the case. First of all at 
least one economist, Herbert Simon, was one of the direct supporters of such revolution. Secondly, 
in the history of economic thought preceding the cognitive revolution there are some authors who 
put mind’s workings at the basis of some aspects of the economics analysis. 
 
Before providing his relevant contribution to economics, Alfred Marshall attended to philosophy 
and neurobiology (Marshall 1867-8; Raffaelli 1994 and 2002). In some articles of the ’70s he 
described a very detailed model of the mind and its functioning.  Marshall utilises this model on the 
workings of mind to describe the nature and role of organizations, the processes of emergence of 
routines, and the mechanism of innovation and creativity in hierarchical structures. And not only 
this. In some relevant sections of his Principles (1890), he holds the idea that mental models matter 
in explaining economic processes: for example, he stresses the role of personal learning in the 
problem-solving process. His ideas in this field were obviously based on the neuro-biological 
knowledge of his time. In spite of this, he largely anticipated the analytical approach proposed by 
March and Simon and by Khaneman and Tversky almost a century later. Marshall can therefore be 
considered as the father of the cognitive approach to organizations.   
We should not forget that Marshall also gave some relevant contributions to the concept of 
evolution – quite different from the Schumpeterian tradition - that characterises the contemporary 
approach to self-organization analysis and which could develop into a particular branch of cognitive 
                                                           
1 For a wide historical reconstruction, see Rizzello 1999. For one the first explicit applications of the cognitive approach 
to economics see Viale 1997. 
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economics. In fact, Cognitive economics applies a concept of evolution that seems in some respect 
different from that proposed in the Schumpeterian tradition, that includes Alchian, Nelson and 
Winter. This concept of evolution can be defined as the Marshallian approach to explaining 
economic change, which lays special emphasis on the relevance of endogenous changes and the 
self-organizations analysis (Foster 1993 and 1997, Hodgson 1997; Foss 1997; Witt 1997; Rizzello 
2003). 
 
Yet Marshall’ position is not  isolated. For example, when considering the old Institutionalism we 
could find some interesting contributions by Veblen, which is linked to a modern cognitive 
approach.  The author devised a notion of mind to explain the processes of institutional 
transformation, which had been ignored for many decades. Yet today, while scholars are becoming 
aware of the relevance of psychological aspects in economics, Veblen’s theory on institutional 
evolution and transformation is having a revival. What emerges from this literature seems very 
interesting. According to Veblen, the mind is an active tool, able to “effect events in the course of 
nature” and “exert a causality on things” (Veblen 1994: 176). As Viano pointed out (2003), this idea 
on the mind is very close to Kant’s. Furthermore, Veblen elaborated a modern conception of 
“routine”, as knowledge incorporated in mechanical implements, developed many years after in the 
evolutionary literature2.    Another tradition contributing to the birth of a cognitive approach is that 
inaugurated by Carl Menger. The Austrian school of economics includes one the most important 
economists who produced seminal works to renovate economics based on a cognitive approach: 
Friedrich von Hayek. Hayek developed many insights of his mentor Carl Menger, namely the 
methodological subjectivism and the relevance of the nature and role of institutions for economics.  
According to Menger (1963), scarcity is a subjective condition, which depends on the personal 
individual characteristics and on the capacity of the subject to perceive and represent external data. 
Action happens in a context characterised by uncertainty and, as indicated by Hayek in particular, 
the criterion of choice in conditions of perfect information is unacceptable. Hayek stressed the point 
that the most relevant problem for economics  is to explain how individuals acquire information, 
and produce and use knowledge. Hayek differentiates between information and knowledge. The 
former has an objective dimension. It is contained in languages, symbols, signals etc. In order to 
make decisions people acquire information. This is a costly process, constrained by the limits of the 
human mind in the acquisition and processing of information. However, individuals act by using 
knowledge and not information. Personal knowledge, in fact, is the fruit of the subjective 
elaboration of external information, through a series of mental and neuro-biological processes, 
which start from perception and representation and end up in actions. Hayek provides a detailed 
description of all these processes in his book entitled The Sensory Order, which is still a milestone 
for the cognitive approach (Hayek 1952 and 1963).  
 
Hayek claims that the mind is a framework that orders perception through acts of interpretation, 
which produces and elaborates symbols. The human neuronal structure classifies external sensorial 
data by means of a process of associating classes of stimuli into classes of responses. The 
significance that we give to each perception depends upon the genetic characteristics of the 
individual the previous activities of classification of external stimuli (experience). The mind does 
not receive sensations in a passive way. On the contrary, it is an active tool that interacts with the 
external environment. Furthermore, the mind continuously builds the image of itself and the world 
and rebuilds them tacitly and without awareness (Hayek 1952).  
This image of itself and the world is the framework that allows us to attribute significance to 
external information by means of personal and idiosyncratic interpretations. More importantly, this 
allows us to construct knowledge. Through a learning process that takes place over the years, 
                                                           
2 On the role and relevance  of cognitive aspects in Veblen’s concept of evolution scholars are not in full agreement. 
See the special issue  of the Cambridge Journal of Economics (Vol. 22, No. 4) edited by G. Hodgson, published in July 
1998 and, for some different opinions, see Viano 2003.  
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genetic traits and personal experiences, in turn, continuously redesign the neuronal circuitries that 
represent the image of ourselves and the external world, depending on both personal activities and 
the action of innate bio-regulatory circuitries. This mechanism explains how the brain ensures the 
polarity between environmental adaptation and the protection of its internal integrity.   
The evolution of the mind – i.e. the evolution of our ability to build and process images and 
symbols in order to generate knowledge – happens through the balancing of ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis. Starting from its native structures, the brain evolves by building new nervous 
circuitries. They result from the feedback with the relatively inelastic  (but not completely rigid) 
nature of our a priori mental schemes that interpret external information in a path-dependent way 
(Hayek 1952).  
 
This way the Austrian tradition - and Hayek in particular -, links the micro-foundations of 
economics directly to the psycho-neuro-biological nature of the choice and, more generally, of 
human decision-making. Nevertheless, this aspect is not the ultimate Austrian contribution to the 
cognitive approach. From Menger onwards, the Viennese school proposes that the entire analysis of 
the economic processes in carried out in an institutional context. According to this tradition, 
institutions are not simple exogenous frameworks; on the contrary, their nature and role are strictly 
connected to the limits of the human mind. As suggested by Hayek, institutions arise spontaneously 
as “results of human action but not of human design” (Hayek 1967). Some rules and institutions 
tend to self-consolidate because they have a crucial role in social co-ordination, that is they simplify 
and standardise the framework where people must utilise their limited mental faculties to operate in 
the complex systems.  Hayek, in particular, stresses the existing link between mind and institutions 
(Hayek 1942).  
This tradition - linking mind and institutions - continues today in that part of the recent New 
Institutional Economics literature that explains the evolution of institutions by means of the 
spreading of shared mental models and rule-based behavior (Langlois 1985, 1986 and 1998; 
Rizzello – Turvani 2000 and Budzinski 2001). It also tends to use the good analytical tools offered 
by the social cognitive learning theory – elaborated by Bandura (1977)– in better understanding the 
cognitive behavioral foundations of cultural evolution (Rizzello – Turvani 2002). As stressed by 
Loasby (2000), the human ability  to share rules and institutions rests on the architecture of the 
brain which permits differentiation, “but which also makes possible what Adam Smith [in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiment] called sympathy, the capacity of imagining oneself in the situation of 
another” (p. 8) 3.  
 
 In the Austrian tradition there are at least two more courses of contemporary economic analysis. 
One concerns the role of cognitive frames in organizations as a co-ordination process, ranging from 
entrepreneurial imagination and representation to the homogenisation of differentiated individual 
motivation and dispersed knowledge. We may also refer to a long-lasting tradition, which includes 
Hayek, Kirzner, Metcalfe and Witt, whose contributions could, in some respects, urge to reconsider 
the relevant psychological elements of the Schumpeterian theory of the entrepreneur.          
In a similar vein, it might be interesting to explore - along the lines of Lachmann (1943) and in the 
light of a new cognitive perspective linked to the Austrian approach - the role of expectations in 
economic life as suggested by Keynes, and to compare it with the tradition inaugurated by Muth 
and further developed by Lucas and Sargent4.    
 
As indicated earlier, some relevant aspects in Marshall’s philosophical and economic works were 
proposed again many decades later by Herbert Simon. Simon shares with Marshall both the idea 
                                                           
3 More generally, Loasby (1999)  makes clear the relevance of  Marshall’s thought for the cognitive approach to 
economics.  
4 As Walliser (1989) points out, rational expectations tradition concerns “homo cogitans” and cognitive rationality, 
which is considered different from instrumental rationality, that aims to explain the actions of “homo economicus”.     
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that the nature of organizations is linked to the workings of human mind and the opinion that human 
knowledge tends to be codified in routines.5 
 The cognitive approach to economics in Hayek’s and the Austrian tradition provides good tools for 
a dynamic institutional analysis while Simon’s cognitive approach to economics sheds new light on 
the nature, role and evolution of organizations.  
The seeds of a new impulse to the cognitive approach to economics and organizations, after 
Marshall and Hayek, can be found in two celebrated books: Organizations, published by March and 
Simon in 1958, and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, published by Cyert and March in 1963. 
These books were conceived in the 1950’s, when March and Simon were at Carnegie, and 
participating in the development of a new Graduate School of Industrial Administration. At the 
Graduate School, along with Richard Cyert and Herbert Simon, March developed a new approach 
to the understanding of human behavior in organizations and institutions; their work opened the 
black box of organizations, proposing a new vision and allowing a deeper understanding of the 
organizational life. New ideas, now considered “classic”, such as bounded rationality, problem 
solving, ambiguity, organizational learning, and standard operating procedures, were generated and 
explored.   
 
To better understand the impact of these two books on the traditional approach, we should 
remember that the economic theory at that time was really poor and limited in its capacity to 
explain human behaviors within organizations. 
The theories inherited from the past that attempted to explain the nature of organizations were on 
the ground: on the one hand, there was Taylor’s so-called “scientific” management approach; on the 
other, the theory of planning, based on Walras’ general equilibrium theory and Barone theorems on 
welfare economics. Finally, the theory of bureaucracy originated by Max Weber, and later 
developed by Merton and others. 
In the first approach, organizations were depicted as mechanical processes, in line with the 
historical effort to rationalise and mechanise large parts of the economic production at the 
beginning of the century. Charlie Chaplin’s “Modern Times” (1936) give us the vivid imagine of 
this vision of the modern organizations. This way of depicting organizations was to some extent 
coherent with the second view, namely the neo-classical theory of the firm: a technological 
approach in which firms actions and sizes were explained on the basis of optimal decisions made on 
the ground of known and given technologies.  
However, despite these limits, neo-classical economics gave a strongly influential contribution to 
the organizational analysis, with the debate on the efficiency of planned systems: the relation 
between centralisation and decentralisation of economic activities and the limits of the “invisible 
hand”, were the key issues of this question. 
 
From Planning to Organizational Learning: Simon and March revolution 
 
The debate began in the early years of this century, when the dilemma concerning the feasibility of 
a collectivist planned economy was raised by the appearance - on the European political scene - of 
                                                           
5 With reference to the literature of those years on cognitive economic field, another economist should be mentioned, 
who left us with a relevant contribution on the role of the imagination in human decision-making. The representation of 
the decision-making process, based on images production, exploration and exploitation, was recently applied to 
economics by Beach and Mitchell (1987), through the formulation of the “image theory”.  In a glance to the past and in 
the history of economic thought, we discover  that imagination was considered relevant to explain decisions by March, 
Shackle, Simon  (Augier-Kreiner 2000) but it was neglected in the traditional decision-making. Along the lines of this 
course of research,  recent literature (Patalano- Rizzello 2002 and Patalano 2003) indicates that  the contribution of 
Boulding is very relevant to explain the role of imagination in the decision-making process (on the relevance of the  
process  of shared imagination, see also Witt 1998 and Denzau-North 1994,  on the organization and institutional 
dimensions, respectively).   
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parties inspired by socialism as an ideology and a political Utopia. The problem was to answer the 
question whether a socialist (collectivist) economic system based on public ownership of the means 
of production and on planning could work. 
The controversy took partly the form of a clash between the two rival economic schools of neo-
classical theory and Marxian theory, but this contrast seemed to loose much part of its relevance 
when Barone showed that a planned economy can be treated with the analytical tools of general 
economic equilibrium theory; it was therefore formally possible to prove the workability of a 
planned economy: that is, the viability of the ‘pure logic of socialism’ and particularly the existence 
of equilibrium in planned economies. 
Barone employed the Walrasian model to provide formal demonstration of the fact that equilibrium 
can exist in a planned economic system.  
He implicitly assumes that the distributed computation of equilibrium performed in the markets by 
the ‘invisible hand’ can be replaced by calculations performed directly and intentionally by an 
alternative institution within planned organizations, i.e. what might be called the ‘Central Planning 
Office’. 
This brought about the question whether a (presumably cumbersome) bureaucracy could replace 
market mechanisms and perform the calculations required to establish the levels of supply and 
demand for all goods and services, through production planning. 
This issue provoked heated debate in the neo-classical school. The Austrian branch of the 
marginalist school - Menger, in particular -, argued that planning was theoretically impossible, and 
claimed that the Planning Office could never possess all the knowledge and information required to 
artificially calculate what the market could calculate  ‘naturally’ via price movements. As a member 
of the opposite school, O. Lange (1937) responded to the impossibility argument with a model of 
socialist planning based on decentralised decision-making, which seemed to settle the question in 
favour of the socialist position (Keizer 1994). Some years later, in Capitalism Socialism and 
Democracy, Schumpeter argued that not only was an artificial calculation entirely feasible, but that 
the introduction of an extensive bureaucracy would render the system more straightforward than 
was the case in a market economy.  
Hayek wrote a critical rejoinder to Schumpeter’s position (Hayek, 1980: 90) where he noted that 
Pareto himself, while suggesting that the problem of calculation was essentially the same in 
socialist and market economies, had sustained the practical impossibility of socialist calculation, 
due to the astronomically high number of equations that were to be computed. 
 
It is clear that all the key elements in the debate on socialist planning can be fully transferred to the 
question of feasibility and efficiency of planning in large business organizations. Here again the 
question of decentralisation is relevant to understand the working of business organizations. 
 In Organizations, and after a detailed discussion of the comparative advantages of decentralisation 
over centralisation, March and Simon note that even Hayek was right in asserting that “given 
realistic limits on human planning capacity the decentralised system will work better than the 
centralised”, thus the existence of external economies could reverse the relative advantage of 
decentralisation. They therefore suggest that, if we limit our analysis to a definition of planning that 
is essentially static, the question of the degree of decentralisation in organizations cannot be settled 
once and for all from a priori considerations. They claim that only in dynamic conditions (and today 
we would prefer to say in evolutionary conditions) the question of decentralisation may be clearly 
set.  
 
The key to moving away from the concept of programming as computation based on static 
conditions was provided when it was acknowledged that most managerial decisions take place in 
conditions of highly unstructured form and very incomplete information.  
 In 1956 Coyest, Simon and Row carried out an empirical analysis of managerial decisions which 
revealed an evident 'dualism' of behavior: on the one hand, a behavior guided by a coherent choice 
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among alternatives, typical of structured and repetitive conditions; on the other, behavior 
characterised by highly uncertain and ill-defined conditions, where the predominant role was played 
by problem-solving activities. 6  
The core of the decision-making process is therefore the activity of searching and learning that 
provides participants with the information and knowledge they require to achieve their goals. The 
conditions for the standard choice theory to be applied are entirely lacking, because the preference 
orderings are highly incomplete, decisions are simultaneously inconsistent and choices are largely 
ineffective in relation to the goals to be pursued. The most important part of the process is driven by 
the ability of the subjects to formulate and solve problems.  
Bounded rationality, unprogrammed decisions and learning are the key aspects of human behavior 
in organizations under ill-defined conditions. 
This new vision leads March and Simon to completely redefine the description and analysis of 
“planning”: planning is no longer a static and mechanic activity based on rational decisions 
immersed in a world of complete information.  Planning is now based on “organizational learning”. 
Search therefore becomes a key activity in organization, as well as being a resource that can be 
differently improved within different organization, giving rise to differentiation in organizational 
performances. Adaptation is the crucial element that may generate differentiation and sub-
optimalities.  
 
From A Behavioral Theory of the Firm: 
 
“If we assume that search is problem-oriented, we must also assume that 
search rules change. Most simply, what we require in the models are considerations of 
the following type: when an organization discovers a solution to a problem by 
searching in a particular way, it will be more likely to search in that way in future 
problems of the same type; when an organization fails to find a solution by searching 
in a particular way, it will be less likely to search in that way in future problems of the 
same type. Thus, the order in which various alternative solutions to a problem are 
considered will change as the organization experiences success or failure with 
alternatives. 
In a similar fashion, the code (or language) for communicating information 
about alternatives and their consequences adapt to experience. Any decision-making 
system develops codes for communicating information about the environment. Such a 
code partitions all possible states of the world into a relatively small number of 
classes of states. Learning consists in changes in the partitioning. In general, we 
assume the gradual development of an efficient code in terms of the decision-making 
rules currently in use. Thus, if a decision rule is designed to choose between two 
alternatives, the information code will tend to confine all possible states of the world 
into two classes. If the decision rules change, we assume a change in the information 
code, but only after a time lag reflecting the rate of learning. The short-run 
consequences of incompatibilities between the coding rules and the decision rules 
form some of the most interesting long-run dynamic features of an organizational 
decision-making model.” [Cyert and March, 1992, p. 174] 
 
Organizations therefore evolve through problem solving, and problem solving activities lead to 
modifications in the internal division of work. The idea that the search process involves a change of 
the information code has been further expanded by the recent results from experimental economics 
showing that the creation of mental categories to represent a problem is the basic driver for the 
generation of a division of problems and therefore the source of the correlated errors and biases in 
decision-making (Egidi, 2002). 
 Hence, a relevant conceptual improvement is that not only do organizations learn, but they make 
errors during this process, and – as March’s behavioral description shows – since adaptation may 
                                                           
6 In this last set of conditions, not only must subjects gather information, they must also be able to select the information and 
knowledge that is effectively relevant to their purposes and to assimilate it into the system of knowledge that they already possess. To 
do so, they must have a 'level of competence' adequate to the situation of their choice; they must, that is, implement skills of learning 
and problem solving. 
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easily lead to sub-optimal organizational configurations, errors may be systematic and stable in the 
long run. 
In recent years, a large number of results deriving from experimental economics have demonstrated 
that human decisions display systematic deviations from fully rational ones, and that in many cases 
‘errors’ persist even when the rational solution has been explicitly presented to the subjects. This 
happens both in individual and team decision-making. In the case of teams and organizations, it 
may happen that systematically erroneous decisions are made by organizations, and that they 
remain trapped in sub-optimal routinized strategies, which are not changed even when they are 
highly sub-optimal. Levinthal and March (1993) single out a number of ‘traps’ into which an 
organization may fall during the process of organizational learning; consider for example the 
‘success trap’: here, the tendency of organizations to focus on success may induce them to persist 
excessively in the use of procedures and actions that have been associated with successes in the 
past. Consequently, an organization that falls into this trap tends to anchor its activity in processes 
of organizational exploitation, to the detriment of research and innovation. Moreover, this tendency 
may prevent organizations to adapt to changed environmental conditions. 
 
Hence, the vision of the modern business firm moves more closely towards a realistic approach 
based on experience, and to the building of a new robust conceptual frame to understand and 
explain it. 
Far from being the perfect machines depicted by tradition, that optimally decide their strategies 
using all relevant information, business organizations adapt to evolving reality, trying to build up 
their strategies under conditions of highly unstructured decisional frames. Despite their 
uninterrupted process of learning, they can be sometimes locked in persistent sub-optimal 
conditions.    
The traditional notion of “planning” as static computation is therefore overcome by this new 
theoretical approach, that explicitly takes into account the failures of human rationality. But there 
remains an important question raised by Hayek in the original debate to be taken in consideration: 
the role of the incentives in fostering the efficiency of institutions. 
 
 
Incentives, motivations, conflict: the business organizations as social creation. 
 
Hayek’s dispute against the possibility that a planned system could work as a market economy was 
not based solely on the complexity of economic calculation; he contended that, since a planned 
system lacked competition, the incentives that would ensure its efficient functioning were absent. 
 
'To assume that it is possible to create conditions of full competition without 
making those who are responsible for the decisions pay for their mistakes seems to be 
pure illusion '  (Hayek 1980: 186) 
  
 
Therefore Hayek viewed the role of competition very differently from Walras, and considered that 
failing to  allocate responsibilities was a crucial reason for the inefficiency of planning, beyond the 
question of calculation complexity.  
In his dispute, Hayek was suggesting that the limits of the planning process were rooted in the 
impossibility to allocate responsibilities and incentives; an issue that has received serious attention 
in the contemporary economic theories, and mainly during the 1980’s, when Arrow, by proposing 
the principal-agent theory, explicitly accepted the idea of information asymmetries and focused on 
the reduction of conflicts among agents. His view is based on the assumption that, given the 
asymmetries in knowledge and information between individuals within business organizations, the 
“principal” is prevented from observing directly the abilities and performances of the “agent”.  
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Therefore he suggested to design a system of incentives to reduce the discrepancies between the 
principal’s and the agent’s goals. This approach, developed more than thirty years after 
Organizations and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, while responding in a very ingenious way to 
an important question raised in these books, namely the management of conflict, limits the nature of 
the problem and does not respond fully to the question of the reasons of the feasibility and 
efficiency of planned organizations in market economies. 
Cyert, March and Simon frame this question in a richer and more open way: whilst in the classical 
economic approach individuals are supposed to pursue their own interest in an egotistic, and 
sometimes opportunistic way, March’s view presupposes a more varied and richer depiction of 
human beings: humans in organizations have motivations, they are capable of participating in the 
organizational life and goals, not uniquely as consequence of an efficient design of incentives, but 
also for reasons related to the share of organizational values, which sometimes involve altruism.  
This leads to the idea of organizations as social creations and as institutions. (See on this line 
March and Olsen Rediscovering Institutions, 1989).  
 
From organization as a mechanical process to integrated institutions 
 
March and Simon’s picture of organizations works at two different levels: on the first level, mainly 
analysed in “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm”, organizations are characterised by bounded 
rationality, adaptation, unresolved conflicts, and sometimes permanent sub-optimalities. Here, 
decisions may be affected by high uncertainty and ill-defined conditions but rights and 
responsibilities are supposed to be clearly allocated and incentives reasonably well defined.  
What happens then, when rights, rules and responsibilities are also not distributed in a clear pattern? 
Explorations in this direction characterise some of March publications in the 1970’s and 80’s. 
Among the many, a clear description of organizational disorder can be found in “A garbage can 
Model of Organizational Choice”, written in 1972 jointly with Michael Cohen and Johan Olsen. 
The model represents the “second level” of March’s analysis, in which rights and preferences are 
also poorly defined. According to his view, instead of considering organizations as mechanical 
processes, in which decisions take place optimally, we wonder how comes that organizations define 
and achieve their goals when facing conditions of high uncertainty and unclear allocations of rights, 
rewards and responsibilities. 
The question we have been discussing at the beginning of this section is therefore completely 
reversed: instead of considering organizations as mechanical processes, where decisions take place 
optimally, we wonder how comes that organizations define and achieve their goals when facing 
conditions of high uncertainty and unclear allocations of rights, rewards and responsibilities. 
This is, in our view, a core problem in the background of many publications by March since the 
1970’s. Here the author assumes a new and more radical vision of organizational phenomena. 
Going beyond the view of large business organizations as coalitions of interests incapable of 
resolving completely the internal conflicts, when introducing the distinction between aggregative 
and integrative institutions, March discloses the fragility of economic and political institutions, and 
the transience of  human actions based merely on egotistic interests. 
 
Routines 
 
The counterpart to the analysis of search and creativity within organizations is the development of 
studies to explain routinized behaviors. As noted earlier, Cyert, Simon and Trow (1956) carried out 
an empirical analysis on managerial decisions which revealed an evident 'dualism' of behavior:  
 
'Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent to which the 
decision-making process is programmed.  At one extreme we have repetitive, well-
defined problems (e.g., quality control or production lot-size problems) involving 
tangible considerations, to which the economic models that call for finding the best 
among a set of pre-established alternatives can be applied rather literally. In contrast 
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to these highly programmed and usually rather detailed decisions, there are problems 
of non-repetitive sort, often involving basic long-range questions about the whole 
strategy of the firm or some part if it, arising initially in a highly unstructured form 
and requiring a great deal of the kinds of search processes listed above.' (Cyert, Simon 
and Trow, 1956, p.238) 
 
 
In Organizations, March and Simon deepen this observation, and provide a definition of “routinized 
behaviors” 
 
"We will regard a set of activities as routinized, [then,] to the degree that 
choice has been simplified by the development of a fixed response to defined stimuli. 
If search has been eliminated, but a choice remains in the form of clearly defined and 
systematic computing routine, we will say that the activities are routinized" (March 
and Simon 1993, page 142). 
 
A part of this definition should be highlighted: routinized behaviors take place when "search has 
been eliminated", i.e. when the individual learning process stops. This clarifies that March and 
Simon provide a “macro” definition of routines as repetitive organizational procedures and at the 
same time a “micro” definition of routinized activities as individual activities automatically 
triggered on the basis of stable mental models. Psychology literature suggests that automaticity in 
behaviors reduces the mental load required to decide during the action, and therefore helps us to 
understand routinized behaviors as the outcome of the human activity of coping with complexity in 
large organizations. 
The notion of routine has been re-visited thirty years after Organization by Nelson and Winter 
(1982). They consider routines as the basic elements of the organization’s life, and innovation as the 
engine of routine creation, in an evolutionary approach to organizational life. In Evolutionary 
Theory of Economic Change   the authors make an interesting effort to more accurately explore how 
routinized behaviors reduce the need for 'rational computation', on the basis of the methodological 
principles enunciated by M. Polanyi in Personal Knowledge. They note that some behavioral 
sequences consist of actions that are often partially inarticulate, i.e. they are not expressed 
linguistically, and need not to be transmitted in the form of messages. This feature leads Nelson and 
Winter to the problem of how tacit knowledge is formed and transferred.  
On the other hand, more along a “micro” view, Cohen and Bacdayan (1991) suggest that routines 
are stored as procedural memory; following Squire's (1987) distinction between procedural and 
declarative memory they claim that procedural memory appears to be the form that stores the 
components of individual skilled actions - for both motor and cognitive skills. They use a laboratory 
experiment to analyse the emergence of procedural behavior by two subjects involved in a game 
that requires co-ordination and co-operation, and its 'sedimentation' in memory. The general point at 
issue here is how the acquisition and memorisation of cognitive skills takes place, and how its 
transfer is possible, i.e. how skills can be re-used.  
These findings suggest that the automaticity with which players repeat the same sequences of 
actions can be explained in terms of automaticity in their mental processes.  Studies on the 
mechanization of thinking - the so-called "Einstellung effect" - have a long tradition in psychology 
(Luchins 1942, 1950). The literature has suggested that routinized behaviors are based on 
"routinized thinking", i.e. on the automatic use of "chunks" which enable individuals to save on 
mental effort (Weisberg 1980, Newell and Simon 1972, Laird Newell and Rosembloom 1987, 
Newell 1990).  
Along the lines of this tradition, we suggest that behind routinized behaviors there lie particular 
features in terms of mental models (Johnson Laird 1983): subjects who behave in a repetitive 
(routinized) way follow set of rules sedimented in the long term memory which enable them to 
make their actions with less mental efforts. In a word, routinized behaviors have to be considered as 
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the outcome of routinized thinking. Under this assumption, "automaticity" is considered important 
not only at behavioral level but also and mainly at the level of mental models. 7  
Interestingly, this property of mental activity - i.e. the need to save on mental efforts, to lighten the 
load on the short term memory by creating mental building blocks and to store new elements of 
knowledge in long term memory - is not only widely analysed in the context of experimental 
psychology, it was also emphasised by Hayek in his The Sensory  Order (1952). 
 
 
Bounded Rationality, Problem-solving 
 
Routinization and division of labour within organizations are the empirical cornerstones for the 
development of the theory of bounded rationality: Simon built this theory upon close observations 
of the behavior of employees and managers in large organizations. During the 1950s and early 
1960s, he took part in numerous collaborations and research projects at the Graduate School of 
Industrial Administration of Carnegie Mellon, including a study on decision-making under 
uncertainty conducted jointly with Charles Holt, Franco Modigliani and John F. Muth. Curiously, 
the conflicting notion of rational expectations (Muth) and that of bounded rationality (Simon) 
originated in the same context. The milestone in the founding of organizational studies on bounded 
rationality, i.e. Organizations, written with James G. March and published in 1958, is also rooted in 
the researches and debates at Carnegie.  
Organizations moved forward from the notion of problem solving as an individual activity to the 
notion of organizational problem solving, clearly recognising the evolutionary processes of 
organizational adaptation and organizational learning within business corporations. The 
identification of these processes proceeded in parallel with the discovery that the division of labour 
can be considered a problem solving activity, and that the recursive division of problems into sub-
problems is a feature of both organizations and computer programs.  
Thus the development of a finer theory of problem solving became crucial to explain the 
organizational routines and procedures within business firms, and their evolution. Developments in 
one of the sciences of the artificial - the theory of computation - became key to development in the 
other - the theory of organizational learning.  Most probably it was for this reason that Simon's 
interests moved to computation theories as natural candidates to explain human problem solving 
and discovery processes.  
About the time he was finishing his work on Organizations, Simon began his collaboration with 
Allen Newell, a celebrated founding father of the Artificial Intelligence. This collaboration gave 
rise to the creation of new mathematical tools to model human problem solving and discovery 
processes. Human Problem Solving, published in 1972 with Allen Newell, is a bridge between 
computation, artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. This is a fundamental step toward 
Cognitivism: Simon went beyond the notion of "computation" as a human activity that relates 
means to ends, replacing it with the notion of symbolic manipulation. 
Simon’s first studies on the limits of rationality, in fact, focused on the restricted ability of 
individuals to construct and explore their strategies for action: celebrated examples of this are the 
insurmountable obstacles encountered by the players of chess and other complex games when 
devising winning strategies. While Simon’s observations and field researches proceeded, he realised 
that beyond the limits to the human ability to “compute” a strategy in depth laid further limitations, 
and that these involved most of the cognitive activities connected with decision-making.  
Therefore, when limits to the human capacity for mental calculation were experimentally 
demonstrated, it became clear to him that this ability was an aspect - an important but not unique 
one - of the mind’s more general capacity to manipulate symbols and to create mental models of 
reality. 
                                                           
7 For a comprehensive debate on this issue, see Cohen et alii (1996) 
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   The awareness that human decision-making can be understood only if mental activities are viewed 
as symbolic manipulation urged the author on the need to build up a bridge to psychology. Simon's 
research shifted to a different version of the problem, subjecting the various mental abilities 
essential to explain human actions - memorisation, categorisation, judgement, problem solving, 
induction - to increasingly intense experimental scrutiny. In parallel with this experimental work, 
Simon developed computational models of intelligence designed to explain the process of 
discovery. Bacon and Dalton’s programs (Langley, Simon, Bradshaw and Zytkow, 1987), for 
example, simulate the process of scientific discovery. 
The shift toward cognitive psychology required a break with tradition: Weber’s analysis of 
rationality and bureaucracy, filtered into the economic models of rational decision-making, had a 
favourable reception for over a century, and was therefore deeply rooted in the economists’ 
tradition. While this approach proved incapable of giving  full account of managers’ behaviors, that 
is of the ability to solve problems and innovate in uncertain and evolving environments, an 
alternative approach was missing, and consequently the economists were describing managers’ 
activities with inappropriate tools.   
As a matter of fact, the standard theory of decision-making makes reference to a context of 
decisions as an exogenous element:  individuals are considered as experts that possess all cognitive 
skills needed to select the relevant information and evaluate all possible consequences of their 
decisions.  The group of Carnegie provides a first alternative picture of managerial activities and a 
new set of analytical tools to describe it. From their analysis it emerged that the decision is only the 
final step of a complex process in which individuals frame the conditions to make a choice and 
learn to represent and approach the emerging problems. 
Simon’s intuition that decision-making is deeply rooted in learning activity has been largely borne 
out by psychological research, and it gives us important directions for future inquiries. Since the 
mid-1970s until their most recent study Choices, Values and Frames, Tversky and Kahneman have 
investigated the psychological principles that govern the creation, perception and evaluation of 
alternatives in decision-making processes. They find that preferences vary substantially according 
to the way the choice problem is presented (‘framed’). They show that preferences are constructed 
by individuals in the process itself of their elicitation; a clear demonstration of this process is 
provided by the well-known experiments in which different representations of the same choice 
generate a reversal of preferences. 
   This suggests that the crucial aspect of the decision-making process is the ability to construct new 
representations of problems. This point was already present in nuce in Simon’s empirical analysis 
of managerial decisions conducted in the 1950s. The research we mentioned earlier, where Cyert, 
Simon and Trow pointed out an evident dualism in managerial behavior, was beginning to 
discriminate among two different aspects of decision-making processes: on the one hand the 
coherent choice among alternatives, on the other the search for the knowledge necessary to define 
the context where choices are made. The evolution of the analytical tools and the experimental 
outcomes shifted the focus from the coherence/incoherence of choices to the representation and 
editing of problems How mental models used by individuals and institutions to frame problems are 
constructed became a crucial issue to be addressed by the decision theory, an issue that will yield a 
better understanding of human innovative activities within institutions.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Besides re-establishing close connections among economics, psychology and the cognitive sciences, 
a clear line of thought from Simon to Kahneman and Tversky suggests that the actions of decision-
makers in the real economic world should be studied, not merely in terms of rationality but also in 
the light of the capacity of the human mind to frame problems and represent reality in innovative 
ways, in an endeavour to reduce uncertainty and ignorance. The cognitive approach to economics is 
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the new discipline now investigating the classic yet still unresolved question of human creative 
decisions and learning, and their relationship with the nature and evolution of institutions.  
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